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Abstract 
Locational-based Coupling of Electricity Markets: 
Benefits from Coordinating Unit Commitment and 
Balancing Markets 
EPRG Working Paper    1022 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics  1044 
Adriaan Hendrik van der Weijde and Benjamin F. 
Hobbs  
 
We formulate a series of stochastic models for committing and 
dispatching electric generators subject to transmission limits. The 
models are used to estimate the benefits of electricity locational 
marginal pricing (LMP) that arise from better coordination of day-ahead 
commitment decisions and real-time balancing markets in adjacent 
power markets when there is significant uncertainty in demand and wind 
forecasts. The unit commitment models optimise schedules under either 
the full set of network constraints or a simplified net transfer capacity 
(NTC) constraint, considering the range of possible real-time wind and 
load scenarios. The NTC-constrained model represents the present 
approach for limiting day-ahead electricity trade in Europe. A 
subsequent redispatch model then creates feasible real-time schedules. 
Benefits of LMP arise from decreases in expected start-up and variable 
generation costs resulting from consistent consideration of the full set of 
network constraints both day-ahead and in real-time. Meanwhile, using 
LMP to coordinate adjacent balancing markets provides benefits 
because it allows intermarket flow schedules to be adjusted in real-time 
in response to changing conditions.  These models are applied to a 
stylised four-node network, examining the effects of 
varying system characteristics on the magnitude of the 
locational-based unit commitment benefits and the 
benefits of intermarket balancing. Although previous 
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studies have examined the benefits of LMP, these usually examine one 
specific system, often without a discussion of the sources of these 
benefits, and with simplifying assumptions about unit commitment. 
We conclude that both categories of benefits are situation dependent, 
such that small parameter changes can lead to large changes in 
expected benefits. Although both can amount to a significant percentage 
of operating costs, we find that the benefits of balancing market 
coordination are generally larger than the unit commitment benefits. 
Keywords electricity prices, international electricity exchange, electricity 
market model, electricity transmission 
JEL Classification L94 
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 1. Introduction 
European electricity markets have changed profoundly in the last decades. 
Increased deregulation and privatisation have accompanied the decoupling of 
transmission, distribution and generation activities in national electricity 
markets. At the same time, markets are becoming increasingly interconnected. 
Moreover, rapid growth of renewable generation is leading to more operational 
uncertainty, which will encourage even more interconnection in the future. As a 
consequence of these developments, the need for an efficient congestion pricing 
mechanism to facilitate international electricity trade in Europe while respecting 
transmission and security constrains is becoming increasingly important 
(Brunekreeft et al. 2005; Hobbs et al. 2005).  
 At present, interconnection capacity between most European countries is 
auctioned day ahead or earlier, and not explicitly coordinated with the operation 
of energy markets. The amount of available transmission capacity, called Net 
Transfer Capacity (NTC), is determined by transmission system operators 
(TSOs).2 For three reasons, these NTCs are generally set lower than the sum of 
                                                 
1 This project is supported by EPSRC Supergen Flexnet and US National Science Foundation 
funding. We are grateful for suggestions by Cedric De Jonghe (KU Leuven), Karsten Neuhoff (CPI 
Berlin), Bert Willems (Univ. Tilburg), members of the Flexnet Markets & Investments working 
group and participants of the CPI workshop on Renewables Integration. 
2 In reality, there is a difference between NTCs, which in Europe are published twice a year as 
market guidance, and Available Transmission Capacities (ATCs), which are usually calculated 
day-ahead for a whole day and represent the actual amount of trade that will be allowed. ATCs 
for any given day can differ significantly from the earlier announced NTCs. In our analysis, we do 
not make a distinction between the two, but simply refer to the amount of transmission capacity 
that can be auctioned as NTC. 
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the thermal current limits of the constituent individual transmission lines. First, 
spare capacity needs to be provided to ensure system security. In particular, in 
case of generator or line outages, flows may suddenly increase between the 
countries, which need to be accommodated safely. Secondly, interconnections 
often consist of several individual circuits, so that, depending on the precise 
locations and amounts of load and generation, it is possible that individual 
circuits may be overloaded even though the total flow is less than the sum of the 
thermal capacities of the constituent circuits. Third, in the absence of a locational 
pricing system, the locations and levels of generation and load are not precisely 
known at the time of the day-ahead auction, so the exact pattern of flows 
between countries will also be uncertain. Thus, the TSO will generally set NTCs 
to a conservatively low level to ensure feasibility of those flows. However, even 
with those precautions, some scheduled flows might still be infeasible in real 
time and redispatch will be necessary. On the other hand, if spare capacity is 
available in real time, there may be opportunities for incremental trade between 
balancing markets. However, the economic value of that trade may be less than if 
the opportunity had been anticipated when committing generators, because once 
committed, the generation system’s flexibility is limited in real time. 
 Another inefficiency in present market designs that locational-based 
pricing can address is the lack of coordination of balancing mechanisms in 
different markets. Presently, TSOs in adjacent European countries manage 
transmission constraint violations and unscheduled imbalances by redispatch 
within their own market areas, while attempting to maintain day-ahead 
schedules of international power exchange (Oggioni & Smeers 2009). If 
neighbouring operators could coordinate their balancing markets while 
respecting locational constraints, redispatch costs could be reduced and 
additional trading opportunities taken advantage of. 
Clearly, the use of NTCs to limit day-ahead trade rather than the actual 
network constraints cannot, at least in theory, maximize expected net welfare. 
This is also true of the failure to coordinate real-time redispatch in adjacent 
markets. An alternative, which is implemented in several markets around the 
world and is currently being considered by the European Union, is locational 
marginal pricing (LMP) in both day-ahead and real-time markets. LMP is also 
known as nodal pricing, flow-based allocation or market splitting. As described 
by Schweppe et al. (1988), a nodal pricing system defines a marginal price at 
each location and time period that reflects the cost of delivering power to that 
location at that time, given the transmission constraints. Hsu (1997) gives a 
detailed explanation of this process. These prices are obtained by clearing energy 
and transmission markets simultaneously in a single optimisation model, 
recognising the impact of all network constraints. LMP is now used in by TSOs in 
six regional markets in the U.S.; O’Neill et al. (2006) provide an overview of US 
LMP systems, and Price (2007) describes one implementation in detail. If LMP 
could be implemented Europe-wide, international transmission would not have 
to be auctioned off. Instead, transmission capacity could be allocated by pricing 
constraints efficiently in multicountry day-ahead and real-time energy markets.  
 Introducing an Europe-wide LMP system could enhance power market 
efficiency in several ways. Short-term efficiency improvements include more 
efficient unit commitment, improved dispatch within countries, allocative 
efficiency improvements (from more efficient pricing of power to demand), cost 
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decreases, market power reductions from increased international trade, and 
increased security of network operation through increased visibility. Meanwhile, 
potential long-term efficiency improvements can arise from better siting of 
power plants and industrial loads, and possibly the substitution of better 
management of existing transmission assets for transmission investment. 
Brunekreeft et al. (2005) discuss some of these effects in more detail. 
 Our work explores the determinants of two specific components of the 
benefits of considering network constraints via LMP. LMP-based market 
coupling avoids the use of NTC approximations in day-ahead unit commitment, 
and can facilitate coordination of redispatch and trade in adjacent markets in 
real-time. Our purpose is to quantify these benefits for a simple four-node 
network in order to explore the economic drivers that determine their 
magnitude.3 
 Many studies have recommended nodal pricing over other market 
designs (e.g., Chao et al. 2000; Ehrenmann and Smeers 2005; Brunekreeft et al. 
2005; Imran and Bialek 2008), and some have estimated individual categories of 
LMP benefits for particular markets. Most of those analyses focus on allocative 
efficiency and dispatch improvements, with a few studies also reporting benefits 
resulting from more efficient international transmission and more efficient unit 
commitment. Green (2007) estimates that moving to LMP would provide 
efficiency benefits in the UK in the amount of 1.5% of generator revenues due to 
better dispatch and allocative efficiency. Leuthold et al. (2005) estimate a 0.6-
1.3% increase in social surplus in Germany, with an additional 1% if more wind 
capacity is built, because that would increase congestion. They do not describe 
the exact sources of those benefits, but these include more efficient domestic 
dispatch and allocative efficiency. Weigt (2006) extends the model used in 
Leuthold et al. (2005) to include unit commitment of aggregations of power 
plants and international transmission; he obtains a benefit equal to 0.06% of the 
social surplus for the whole of Europe, the net effect of a 0.78% increase in 
consumer surplus and a 3.55% decrease in producer surplus. In the U.S., an 
empirical analysis of trade changes accompanying expansion of the 
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) LMP system to the Midwestern U.S. 
found that gains from trade more than doubled between the original and newly 
included regions of PJM (Mansur and White 2009). The benefit was 
approximately $170M/year, compared to a one-time cost of $40M to extend PJM.  
 The study that is closest to our analysis of unit commitment benefits is 
Barth et al. (2009), who estimate an LMP benefit of 0.1% of the total system 
operation cost, as a result of more efficient international transmission, domestic 
dispatch and unit commitment of aggregations of generators. Their analysis does 
not attempt to disaggregate these benefits by category, nor do they undertake 
sensitivity analyses. Because each country is treated as a zone without 
considering individual circuits between countries or congestion within countries, 
this estimate should be viewed as a lower bound. 
 There are fewer quantitative analyses of the benefits of international 
redispatch, although there is a large amount of literature that argues for its 
                                                 
3 It is possible that the international redispatch benefits could be realised by balancing 
mechanisms other than coupled LMP systems. To the extent that TSO efficient coordination by be 
achieved by other systems, our estimates of this category of benefits are relevant to evaluation of 
those mechanisms. 
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adoption (e.g., Meeus et al. 2005; Vandezande et al. 2008, 2010). Oggioni and 
Smeers (2009) use a simple network similar to ours to study the benefits of 
coordinating international redispatch arising from the coupling of electricity 
markets. They find that market coupling with LMP is more efficient than using 
NTCs and that, in a system with NTCs, international coordination is more 
efficient than domestic-only redispatch for adjusting schedules in order to meet 
all transmission constraints (saving 0.4 €/MWh or more, for the system 
analysed). Their benefit estimates are likely to be low because they include 
neither benefits arising from better unit commitment (as commitment decisions 
are not considered) nor benefits of coordinating balancing markets in the face of 
uncertain loads and supplies (as their model assumes no uncertainty). 
Meanwhile, Vandezande et al. (2009) estimate the benefits of cross-border 
balancing between Belgium and The Netherlands (compared to no international 
redispatch) to be around 40% of the total balancing costs.  
 Next, we present the methodology and model formulation. Data 
assumptions are summarised in section 3, followed by the results in section 4 
and conclusions in section 5. 
 
 2. Method 
We use stochastic (two-stage) programming to find the unit commitment (first-
stage) and redispatch (second stage) decisions that minimize expected system 
costs over the distribution of possible real-time conditions. Doing this 
considering the full set of transmission constraints in both stages will, by the 
definition of optimisation, yield expected costs that are no worse than the 
expected cost resulting from a heuristic approach considering only approximate 
NTC constraints at the commitment stage and waiting until real-time to impose 
the actual network constraints. However, in practice, the consideration of 
network constraints in unit commitment may not be better because of other 
approximations used by market operators, such as deterministic security 
constraints or the use of a single demand or wind scenario to make commitment 
decisions. To avoid spurious results due to arbitrary choice of such constraints 
or scenarios, we use stochastic optimisation models, in which the contingencies 
that motivate operating reserves are explicitly represented. With these models, 
we can analyse the benefits of LMP in isolation, without the picture being 
muddied by other market imperfections.  
 We consider the simple network in Fig. 1. There are two countries or 
markets, each having two nodes, or ‘buses.’ These buses are connected by four 
lines, and the only contingencies we consider in our main analyses are load and 
wind variations in Country 2 (nodes C and D). As a sensitivity analysis, we 
consider variations at A and B as well. However, our modelling approach is 
general and can be used for a system with more buses and other types of random 
events.  
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Fig. 1 Assumed network 
 
 We consider two basic models, where the first has two variants. The first 
basic model is Model NTC, which is a sequence of two decision stages. The day-
ahead unit commitment problem is first solved subject to an NTC between the 
two countries, followed by real-time redispatch, which is conducted subject to 
the actual network constraints and wind/demand realisations, as well as the 
previously determined commitment schedule. The second basic model is Model 
LMP, in which the unit commitment problem is instead solved subject to the full 
network constraints. Two different instances of model NTC are examined. In the 
first, real-time redispatch (or ‘balancing’) is coordinated (NTC-ID), so that real-
time schedules can differ under different realisations of real-time load and wind. 
The other allows only domestic redispatch, maintaining the same total MW of 
international flow as scheduled day-ahead (NTC-NID). Fig. 2 gives a schematic 
overview of the sequence of calculations for each model.  
 In each case, unit commitment is day-ahead for 24 hours. For simplicity, 
we group these hours into three time periods representing peak, off-peak and 
shoulder hours. The only commitment costs are start-up and minimum run 
(‘fixed’) costs, and the only commitment constraints are minimum run 
constraints; ramp limits and minimum shut-down or operating times are not 
considered. When making commitment decisions, net load (load net of wind 
generation) is unknown. Instead, there are several net load scenarios, each with 
a known probability. In all models in real time, the committed generators are 
dispatched against the realised net load recognising the actual network 
constraints. We assume that all generators truthfully bid their costs and 
commitment constraints, and do not attempt to exercise market power. A 
different model formulation would be required to estimate the benefits of 
locational-based market coupling resulting from a reduction of market power or 
the avoidance of generator gaming. These are different categories of benefits 
than those examined here, and without the scope of this paper.  
 
~ ~ 
~ ~ 
Country 1 Country 2 
QD 
A 
B 
C 
D 
QC 
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Fig. 2 Sequence of decisions and calculations in models 
 
2.1. Notation 
Sets          indexes 
H   Nodes        h 
I   All generators      i 
hI   Generators at node h       i 
XI   Electricity sinks (in overgeneration situation)  i 
CONVI   Thermal generators       i 
CTI   Combustion turbines      i 
J   Real-time net load scenarios    j 
K   Transmission lines      k 
T   Time periods       t 
 
Parameters 
CL  Real-time penalty for deviating from day-ahead international 
schedules [$/MWh] 
iFC   Fixed cost of generator i if committed [$/h] 
tH   Length of time period t [hours] 
iMC   Marginal cost of generator i [$/MWh] 
NTC   Net transfer capacity in the NTC unit commitment model [MW] 
NTC-ID 
International 
redispatch 
TSO sets NTC Day-ahead unit 
commitment 
subject to NTC 
Net load realised 
LMP 
Real-time 
dispatch 
DA unit commitment 
subject to network 
constraints 
Net load realised 
NTC-NID 
TSO sets NTC DA unit commitment & 
international trade subject 
 to NTC 
Domestic 
redispatch only 
Net load realised 
 7 
min
iP   Minimum run level of generator i, if committed [MW] 
max
iP   Maximum run level of generator i, if committed [MW] 
hkPTDF  Power transmission distribution factor describing the effect upon 
flow on line k as a result of a unit power injection at h consistent 
with the linearised DC load flow model [MW/MW]. 
jPR   Probability of scenario j 
hjtQ  Quantity demanded, net of wind output, at node h in scenario j, 
period t [MW] 
iSU   Start-up costs of generator i [$/start] 
kT   Flow constraint on transmission line k [MW] 
Decision variables  
its  Binary variable representing the decision to start-up generator i in 
time period t 
itz   Binary variable representing the decision to operate generator i in 
time period t 
ijtp  Generation by generator i in real-time scenario j, time period t 
[MW], as anticipated by the unit commitment model 
ijtp   Actual real-time dispatch of generator i in scenario j, time period t 
[MW] 
jtl  Shortfall of real-time international power flow from day-ahead 
schedule in scenario j, time period t [MW] 
 
2.2. Model NTC 
Unit commitment stage 
Given the notation above, the objectives of both models NTC and LMP are the 
start-up and fixed commitment costs plus the expectation (over real-time 
scenarios) of variable costs: 
{ , , }
min ( )
it it ijt
i it t i it j t i ijt
s z p
t T i I j J i I
SU s H FC z PR H MC p
   
 
  
 
       (1) 
This is optimised subject to the following constraints. The first set allows 
generation only if a unit is committed (zit = 1), and force start-up costs to be 
incurred (sit = 1) if a unit is committed in one period after being off: 
min max
i it ijt i itP z p P z       , ,
CONVi I j t   (2) 
, 1it i t itz z s        
,CONVi I t    (3) 
0its         ,
CONVi I t    (4) 
Combustion turbines are included to avoid infeasibilities in real time; they have 
no maximum or minimum run levels, but they have to produce non-negative 
amounts of power: 
0ijtp        , ,
CTi I j t    (5) 
We assume ample such capacity, and so do not include an upper bound. 
Electricity sinks are also included to avoid infeasibilities in Country 1 in 
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overgeneration situations; they can only consume power (which is modelled as 
production of non-positive amounts of power), at a cost. 
0ijtp        , ,
Xi I j t    (6) 
Load has to be met in every scenario: 
ijt hjt
i I h H
p Q
 
       ,j t    (7) 
Country 1 cannot produce more power than the NTC allows it to export: 
A B
ijt ijt
i I i I
p p NTC
 
       ,j t    (8) 
As mentioned, we examine two instances of this model; one in which 
international redispatch is possible (NTC-ID), and one where the total amount of 
electricity traded from A to B in real-time in all scenarios is to adhere to the day-
ahead schedule (NTC-NID) subject to imbalance penalties. In the version of the 
model in which no international redispatch is allowed in real-time (NTC-NID), 
we impose the same international flow in every scenario j: 
, 1, , 1,
A B A B
ijt ijt i j t i j t
i I i I i I i I
p p p p 
   
     
  
| |j J    (9) 
However, we omit this constraint for NTC-ID, and flows can depend on the real-
time scenario. 
 
Dispatch stage  
In real time, start-up and fixed costs are sunk, so only the variable costs and the 
costs of not meeting the committed interregional transmission flow are 
minimised: 
{ , }
min 
jtijt
t i jtijt
p l
t i I
H MC p l CL

 
 
 
        (10) 
Constraints (11) – (14) are similar to those in the unit commitment stage: 
min * max *
i it i itijt
P z p P z       , ,i j t    (11) 
0
ijt
p        , ,CTi I j t    (12) 
0
ijt
p        , ,Xi I j t    (13)  
where *itz  is the optimal value of zit from the unit commitment model. The energy 
balance is:  
hjtijt
i I h H
p Q
 
      ,j t     (14) 
Instead of constraint (9), flows are now constrained by the full set of network 
constraints: 
h
hk hjt kijt
h H i I
PTDF p Q T
 
 
  
 
    , ,k j t    (15) 
As mentioned above, in the version of the model without international 
redispatch in real-time (NTC-NID), the redispatch in each j must result in the 
same total MW flow between the two countries as the day-ahead commitment 
model calculates unless a schedule deviation penalty jtl CL is paid. The possibility 
of schedule deviations must be considered because completely fixing the total 
trade in A and B could lead to infeasibilities. The following constraints define a 
nonnegative shortfall jtl  as the difference between the scheduled and real-time 
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flow from Country 1 to Country 2. Only shortfalls in real-time flows need to be 
considered, since excess flows can be avoided by taking advantage of electricity 
sinks in nodes A and B.  
* *
A B A B
jt ijt ijtijt ijt
i I i I i I i I
p p l p p
   
         , ,k j t    (16) 
0jtl        ,j t     (17) 
where *
ijtp  is the generation anticipated in the commitment stage, and is treated 
as a fixed parameter in the real-time model. 
 
2.3. Model LMP 
Unit commitment stage 
The only difference between the NTC and LMP models is that the LMP unit 
commitment and real-time stages use the same (full) set of transmission 
constraints. Hence, Model LMP minimises (1) subject to constraints (2) – (7) and 
h
hk ijt hjt k
h H i I
PTDF p Q T
 
 
  
 
    , ,k j t    (18) 
 
Dispatch stage 
Model LMP’s real-time objectives and constraints are the same as those for 
Model NTC-ID. Note that for the LMP model, *
ijtp
 
is also an optimal solution in 
real time, and so it is not necessary to solve the dispatch model separately. 
Solving equation (1) subject to (2)-(7), (18) solves the entire problem. 
 
2.4. Calculating the benefit of LMP and international redispatch 
Letting 
*
ijt
p  be the optimal dispatch value from the dispatch model, we can then 
calculate the total actual expected cost for each model as the sum of the start-up 
and fixed commitment costs from the unit commitment stage plus the expected 
(across real-time scenarios) variable costs from the redispatch stage: 
** *[ ] ( )i it t i it j t i jtijt
t T i I j J i I
E TC SU s H FC z PR H MC p l CL
   
 
    
 
       (19) 
This is done both for the NTC and LMP models. Subtracting the LMP model cost 
from the NTC-NID model cost yields an estimate of the total benefits of LMP, 
including both the unit commitment and international redispatch (balancing 
market coordination) benefits of considering network constraints day-ahead and 
in real-time. Meanwhile, comparing just the NTC-ID and LMP costs gives an 
estimate of only the unit commitment benefits, while the difference between the 
NTC-NID and NTC-ID costs represents the incremental benefits of international 
redispatch. 
 The degree of distortion of costs because of the use of the NTC constraint 
in the unit commitment stage of Model NTC, rather than actual flow constraints 
(as in the LMP model), will depend on the MW of NTC that is imposed day-ahead. 
In order to avoid overstating the benefits of LMP because of a poor choice of 
NTC, we report a set of results in which we tune the value of NTC in each run of 
Model NTC in order to minimize expected unit commitment and actual dispatch 
costs from that model (Eq. 19), and then compare those costs to the objective 
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function of Model LMP, as just described. This simulates a NTC definition process 
in which the neighbouring TSOs cooperate to determine a single limit on flows to 
be applied in all time periods of the day that will give the most economic benefit, 
guarding against infeasibilities that might arise under extreme demand and wind 
scenarios. In addition, we will also compute those benefits for fixed values of 
NTC (85% of thermal line capacities) to show how much larger the estimated 
benefits of LMP would be if operators do not tune NTC in that manner. The latter 
situation is arguably more realistic, since NTCs are usually chosen day-ahead for 
a whole day.  
 
 3. Data assumptions 
Assumed generator start-up costs, marginal operating costs and fixed costs are 
shown in Table 1. These values were based upon Bard (1988), with the following 
changes. Units were renumbered for convenience. Start-up costs were calculated 
as the average between a hot start-up and a cold start-up. The assumed variable 
cost per MWh was calculated in three steps. First, we calculated Bard (1988)’s 
assumed marginal operating cost at the midpoint of each unit’s operating range. 
Then, we increased the variation in marginal costs among generators in the 
sample to make them more representative of cost variations among plants in 
2010 by expanding the range of marginal costs by a factor of four by the 
following transformation:  
min4( )i i iMC MC MC MC         (20)
 where minMC  is the smallest value of iMC  among units i. The next change was to 
double fixed, marginal and start-up costs to reflect two decades of inflation. This 
results in a dataset with similar ratios of start-up and fixed costs to variable costs 
as the plants in Shaw (1995), Kazarlis et al. (1996), and a recent sample of 
generators in The Netherlands. The plants were then distributed among the 
nodes so that cheaper generation tends to be in Country 1, so that it will tend to 
export power to Country 2. The final modification to Bard (1988)’s dataset was 
to add combustion turbines at nodes C and D to avoid having inadequate 
generation and imports to meet load, and power sinks (called Xi in Table 1) at all 
nodes to avoid infeasibilities due to overgeneration. 
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Table 1 Generation costs and parameters 
i max
iP  
min
iP  iFC  iMC  iSU  Location 
Unit 1 200 50 350 15.40 2860 A 
Unit 2 375 110 800 20.18 2470 A 
Unit 3 250 75 400 27.25 2430 A 
Unit 4 400 130 800 19.20 2760 B 
Unit 5 420 130 840 26.85 2780 B 
Unit 6 850 275 1450 27.24 4100 B 
Unit 7 600 165 1200 31.56 4000 C 
Unit 8 700 225 1080 41.47 3900 C 
Unit 9 1000 300 1640 35.99 3700 D 
Unit 10 750 250 1200 36.18 4200 D 
CT 1 
n/a 
0 90.00 
n/a 
C 
CT 2 0 90.00 D 
XA 0 -90.00 A 
XB 0 -90.00 B 
XC 0 -90.00 C 
XD 0 -90.00 D 
 
 For simplicity, we only consider variability in load net of wind generation 
in our scenarios; contingencies due to transmission or generation equipment 
outages are not included. With the exception of one sensitivity analysis, only 
Country 2 (nodes C and D) has uncertain net load. We consider four scenarios, 
and three time periods. Period 3, the peak hour, has the highest net load levels; 
they are listed in table 2. Net load levels in period 2 are 2/3 of peak load, and 
those in period 1 are 1/3 of peak load. Each period lasts for eight hours, resulting 
in a total number of 24 hours. The net load, in this case, represents the total 
demand for electricity at each node, net of the amount of power generated by 
wind turbines, and also net of the available baseload capacity. As baseload 
generation capacity (such as nuclear or large coal plants) is assumed to be 
always committed, its inclusion in the unit commitment and real-time dispatch 
models would not influence the commitment or generation decisions for other 
units, nor would it influence the unit commitment benefits of LMP or the benefits 
of international redispatch. To reduce computational intensity, we therefore 
subtract the baseload capacity from the load. However, this does mean that 
where we express LMP benefits as fractions of the total system costs, these costs 
exclude the expense of operating baseload plant (and, of course, the capital costs 
of any plant). 
 The four scenarios consist of all possible combinations of low (L) and high 
(H) net load at nodes C and D. We assume LL HHPR PR a   (where the first 
subscript letter refers to C’s outcome and the second refers to D’s) and 
0.5LH HLPR PR a   , where a is initially set to 0.25 so that all scenarios have 
equal probabilities. This parameter can be interpreted as representing the 
correlation between net load at nodes C and D; when a is set to 1/2, there is a 
perfect positive correlation, when a is set to 0, there is a perfect negative 
correlation. The expected peak load at each node is independent of a. 
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Table 2 Peak load net of wind, hjPEAKQ , in all scenarios (MW) 
i HH HL LH HH 
A 0 0 0 0 
B 0 0 0 0 
C 2200 2200 1000 1000 
D 2200 1000 2200 1000 
 
All transmission lines have a maximum capacity of 1000 MW and equal 
reactances. We use linearised DC approximations to calculate line flows. The 
scheduling imbalance penalty CL resulting from deviating from the international 
flow commitment constraint in Model NTC without international redispatch is 
assumed to be 90$/MWh. Thus, all penalties (flow deviation and overgeneration) 
are assumed to be the same as the cost of combustion turbines. Our results do 
not change significantly when these penalties are varied.  
 As noted above, we only consider day-ahead commitment for a single day, 
consisting of three time periods. Ramp rate limits, start-up costs that depend on 
the amount of time that a plant is shut down, and minimum down- or up-times 
are omitted. 
 
 4. Results 
We used Gurobi 2.0.1 to solve both the mixed-integer programs (MIPs) that 
represent the unit commitment stage, and the linear programs (LPs) for the real-
time dispatch. We first solve the models for the base case, using the assumptions 
above, after which we test the sensitivity of the results to changes in generation, 
transmission, and load parameters, in turn.  
 
4.1. Base case 
Model LMP by definition minimises expected unit commitment and dispatch 
costs subject to the actual network constraints. Model NTC finds a solution using 
a different (and incorrect) feasible region in the first stage, through the inclusion 
of an NTC rather than network flow constraints in the unit commitment model, 
followed by a redispatch to attain feasibility under the actual network 
constraints. Hence, by the definition of optimality, the unit commitment benefits 
of LMP as calculated by comparing eq. (19) for the LMP and NTC models can 
never be negative. 
 Fig. 3 shows the difference between the expected total costs of the NTC 
and LMP model solutions, and thus the nodal pricing benefits, as a percentage of 
expected total costs (expected dispatch costs for non-baseload generators) of the 
LMP model. These benefits are shown as a function of the assumed NTC. A range 
of 1000-2000 MW for NTC is considered because values outside that range 
cannot be optimal: each of the two lines has a capacity of 1000 MW, so total trade 
up to 1000 MW can always be accommodated, wherever generation and load are 
located, whereas trade higher than 2000 MW will never be feasible. 
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Fig. 3 Benefits as a function of NTC: Base case assumptions 
 
 From this graph, several conclusions can be drawn, although they depend 
on the assumed parameters, whose effects will be explored below. Firstly, the 
unit commitment benefits of LMP are significant. When international redispatch 
is possible and NTC can be set optimally so as to minimise the total start-up and 
variable costs of generation (between 1860 and 1920 MW, the lowest points on 
the solid line), they are still 0.51% of the total system costs under LMP. However, 
to achieve this, TSOs would have to know the generation costs for every 
generator, as well as the exact net load levels, and then set NTC for every day in 
order to minimize expected costs. In fact, TSOs do not, and indeed cannot, fine-
tune NTC in this manner, which means that the actual benefits will be higher, e.g., 
1.27% if the NTC is always set at 85% of the combined thermal capacity of the 
lines (1700 MW). When international redispatch is impossible, which reflects the 
current situation in most European markets, the unit commitment benefits of 
LMP are much higher, with a minimum at 14.25% of total system costs under 
LMP (the dashed line in Fig. 3). 
 Secondly, the benefits of being able to redispatch internationally are 
significantly higher than the unit commitment benefits of LMP, under the 
assumed parameters. This suggests that even if full market integration is not 
possible, more international coordination on redispatch in balancing markets 
could bring significant benefits. Such coordination would bring costs down from 
the dashed line to the solid line in the figure. 
 Finally, the benefits are relatively constant across the NTC-space when 
international redispatch is not possible, with only a minor increase for very small 
NTCs. This is a direct result of eq. (9), which specifies that a single dispatch 
schedule has to be committed to in the day-ahead unit commitment stage. This 
dispatch schedule has to be optimal across all scenarios and, since imbalance 
penalties are high, it will be set to avoid penalties from forced imbalances and 
overgeneration. Hence, conservative schedules and high levels of commitment in 
Country 2 will be chosen day-ahead so that if loads are high, rescheduling 
penalties can be avoided. Thus, if international redispatch is not possible, the 
NTC is less important in determining the unit commitment benefits of LMP, 
unless it is set very low, as NTC-NID schedules will generally be conservatively 
smaller than in the NTC-ID model. Typically, average international flows are 
lower in the NTC-NID model and, consequently, more units are committed at C 
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and D. For example, for an NTC of 1700MW, the average international flow in the 
NTC-ID model is 1067 MW in the first, 1462 MW in the second, and 1499 MW in 
the third period. In the NTC-NID model, these flows are 502 MW, 600 MW and 
1060 MW, respectively. This supports the above conclusion. 
 In the next subsections, we consider the robustness of these conclusions 
with respect to generator, load, and transmission assumptions. Only results for 
optimal NTCs and NTCs set at 85% of the combined thermal capacity of the two 
transmission lines are shown. Three-dimensional figures, which show the results 
for other NTCs, can be found in the appendix. 
 
4.2. Generator size and total capacity 
To explore the sensitivity of these results to the size of the generators, we vary 
the minimum run levels, maximum run levels, start-up costs and fixed costs by 
+/-50% by multiplying them by a constant ranging between 0.5 and 1.5. Thus, 
both generator size and total capacity change proportionally; in section 4.3, we 
will instead consider the effect of generator sizes holding total capacity fixed. Fig. 
4 shows the benefits for three models: the NTC-ID model with optimal NTCs for 
every size multiplier; the same model with an NTC that is always set at 85% of 
the combined capacity of the two international lines (i.e., at 1700 MW); and the 
NTC-NID model with optimal NTCs.4 In the NTC-NID model, an NTC of 1700 MW 
is always optimal. This is a result of the fact that NTC values matter relatively 
little in this model, as explained above.  
 
Fig. 4 Benefits as a function of generator size, with total capacity proportional to size 
 
 As Fig. 4 shows, the unit commitment benefits of LMP depend on the 
generator size. When international redispatch is possible, the relation between 
benefits and generator size is non-monotonic, and does not seem to follow a 
clear pattern, whether NTCs are set optimally or not. Under optimal NTCs, the 
benefits are zero for many size multipliers. When instead international 
redispatch is impossible, the relation between the size multiplier and the unit 
commitment benefits of LMP is also non-monotonic, but the benefits are 
significantly lower when generators are small. This happens because, as 
                                                 
4 An NTC-NID model with NTCs set at 85% of the combined capacity of the two lines was also 
examined. However, the results from this model do not differ significantly from the NTC-NID 
model with optimal NTCs, and they are therefore not reported separately. 
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generators get smaller, total generation capacity also decreases. Hence, more and 
more generators have to be started up and committed in all scenarios, whatever 
their costs. As unit commitment benefits arise from sub-optimal commitment, 
and there is less room for sub-optimal commitment when there are fewer 
generators that can be left unused without compromising feasibility, these 
benefits shrink as size multipliers get smaller. 
 
4.3. Generator size with fixed total capacity 
In the above analysis, an increase in the capacity of every generator in the 
system yields a proportionate increase in total generating capacity. Thus, the 
effects observed may be because the balance of supply and demand is changed, 
or because the ‘lumpiness’ of commitment decisions is altered. In this and the 
next subsection, we consider the separate impact of generator size, while holding 
the ratio of total capacity to load constant. Although it is not possible to 
continuously increase the average generator size while keeping the total capacity 
constant, we can decrease the generator size by, e.g., doubling or quadrupling the 
number of generators and simultaneously decreasing their capacity so that total 
capacity does not change. We do this in this subsection, while in the next 
subsection we instead consider the effect of generator ‘lumpiness’ by varying just 
the minimum run level. 
 Figs. 5 and 6 compare the unit commitment benefits of LMP in the base 
case (size=s) with a model in which the number of generators is doubled, while 
cutting their min run and max capacity, start up costs, and fixed costs by 50% 
(size=s/2). The limit of this process of shrinking generator size can be 
represented by treating the 0-1 commitment variables as continuous rather than 
binary variables, such that any fraction can be committed. This results in a linear 
program. Thus, the third line in each figure (LP) plots the solution of such a 
relaxed version of the base case, in which all zit’s are continuous variables in the 
range [0,1].  
 
 
Fig. 5 Benefits as a function of generator size, NTC-ID, constant total capacity 
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Fig. 6 Benefits as a function of generator size, NTC-NID, constant total capacity 
 
 Several phenomena can be observed in Figs. 5 and 6. First of all, the 
variations are not as large as observed in Fig. 4, indicating that generator size 
and total system capacity together affect benefits more than the size of individual 
units alone. Second, when international redispatch is possible (Fig. 5), the unit 
commitment benefits of LMP are higher when units are smaller for most values 
of NTC, including the optimal one. When international redispatch is not possible 
(Fig. 6), this relationship is always the case. Secondly, the LP formulation can 
significantly overstate the benefits. Although it understates them for some values 
of NTCs, when averaged over the entire range of NTC, the LP formulation 
overstates benefits by 0.91% for NTC-ID, and by 0.40% for NTC-NID. When NTCs 
are set optimally, the LP formulation overstates the benefits by 0.09% for NTC-
ID, and by 0.41% for NTC-NID; however, for other NTCs, the overstatement is as 
large as 2.69% and 0.44%, respectively. This phenomenon occurs not only under 
the base case parameters, but also for others (not shown).  
 This difference between the MIP and LP formulations can be explained by 
examining the reserve capacity made available to the real-time market in each 
model. When the MIP formulation is used, generators are either started up and 
committed, in which case they have to produce output between their minimum 
and maximum run levels, or they are not started up and committed, in which 
case they cannot produce anything. In many cases, there will be at least one 
generator that is not producing at its maximum output level. This reserve 
capacity provides flexibility if, in real time, the actual transmission constraints 
allow more power to be transported across the two regions then was anticipated 
based on the NTC. However, as generators become smaller, the amount of 
capacity committed day-ahead can be more closely tailored to particular NTCs, 
reducing flexibility. In the extreme case of an LP formulation, just enough 
generation capacity will be committed to meet the maximum load and NTC 
constraints, and no spare capacity is available.  
 We conjecture that the upward bias an LP formulation can cause will be 
smaller in larger systems with few internal transmission constraints. In that case, 
individual units make up a smaller part of the total generation capacity in a 
transmission-constrained submarket, and hence unit commitment can already to 
a large extent be tailored to anticipated transmission capacity. An LP formulation 
may still overstate benefits, but perhaps not by as much as in our test system.  
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4.4. Generator minimum run levels 
Another way of varying the size of generators while keeping the total generation 
capacity constant is to change just the minimum run levels, which we achieve by 
adjusting those levels by a multiplier. As Fig. 7 shows, the relation between the 
multiplier and the commitment benefits of LMP is again non-monotonic, whether 
international redispatch is possible or not. However, whereas for the NTC-ID 
model these benefits are relatively constant, for the NTC-NID model they 
increase with the minimum run multiplier. 
 
Fig. 7 Benefits as a function of minimum run levels 
 
 There are several reasons for these increasing benefits. First of all, 
increasing minimum run levels favours commitment of fewer generators, 
because spilling power when supply is in excess of demand is expensive. For a 
minimum run multiplier of 0.6, three units are committed in the first period, six 
in the second period, and eight in the third period. Increasing the multiplier to 1 
(the base case) results in a reduction to five units in the second period. 
Increasing it even further, to 1.4, decreases the commitment further, to six units 
in the third period. When fewer units are committed, the chance that the 
committed set of units is sub-optimal relative to the realised real-time demand 
and wind is greater, leading to larger unit commitment benefits of LMP. 
Moreover, when fewer units are committed but the net load remains constant, 
the reserve margin decreases, which, as described in the previous subsection, 
can also increase these benefits.  
The second effect of an increase in minimum run levels is that there is an 
increasing probability that power sinks need to be used to maintain real-time 
feasibility due to overgeneration, and that real-time imbalance penalties for 
deviating from international schedules need to be paid. This also increases the 
unit commitment benefits of LMP. 
 As these benefits are increasing in minimum run levels for the NTC-NID 
model, and relatively constant for the NTC-ID model, this means that the benefits 
of international redispatch are also greater for larger minimum run levels. This 
implies that, to some extent, the problems mentioned above can be solved or 
mitigated by international coordination on redispatch; in particular, such 
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coupling of balancing markets decreases the use of power sinks and eliminates 
imbalance penalties on international flows. 
 
4.5. Relative transmission capacity 
The amount of transmission relative to the sizes of the markets might be 
expected to affect the benefits of LMP. To facilitate comparison with the other 
sensitivity analyses, we simulate the effect of changes in relative transmission 
capacity by decreasing or increasing all load and generation capacity by the same 
amount, while holding transmission constant.5 Capacity-related costs, in 
particular start-up and fixed running costs, are also varied proportionally. 
Multiplying these parameters by x is equivalent to a decrease in transmission 
capacity of 1/x. 
 The results are shown in Fig. 8. For this model, NTC-NID, benefits 
decrease in the size/load multiplier, and thus strictly increase in the 
transmission capacity, all else being equal. The reason is that when the available 
transmission capacity decreases relative to demand and the average generator 
size, more units close to the load in Country 2 will have to be committed, at the 
expense of exporting units in Country 1. In the extreme case, where the available 
transmission capacity is close to zero, only Country 2 units will be committed 
and there can be few opportunities for international redispatch. When a smaller 
share of demand is imported, the costs of sub-optimal commitment go down. 
 
Fig. 8 Benefits as a function of generator/load size (larger values indicate smaller relative 
transmission capacity) 
 
 Consequently, international coordination on redispatch can mitigate a 
large part of the inefficiencies of NTC-based market coupling. However, even 
when international redispatch is possible, the unit commitment benefits of LMP 
can still be significant, especially when NTCs are not set optimally. However, as 
with most parameters, although the benefits are sensitive to the size/load 
                                                 
5 If we instead varied transmission capacity, then the range of values within which the optimal 
NTC can lie changes. In all the other analyses, NTC can vary from 1000 MW to 2000 MW. But if, 
for example, the transmission capacity is halved, the optimal NTC will lie between 500 MW and 
1000 MW. This complicates comparison with the other sensitivity analyses. Therefore, instead of 
scaling the transmission capacity up and down while keeping all other parameters constant, we 
scale all other parameters up and down, while keeping transmission capacity constant.  
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multipliers (and thus to transmission capacity), this relation is highly non-
monotonic. 
 
4.6. Load levels 
Next, we test the sensitivity of the unit commitment benefits of LMP to the net 
loads at nodes C and D (the only nodes at which there is demand) by varying the 
load by +/-50%. Fig. 9 shows the results. These results look similar to those in 
Fig. 8 where, in addition to the net load, generator sizes are also varied, and the 
conclusions that can be drawn from them are qualitatively the same.  
In particular, the unit commitment benefits of LMP are sensitive to load 
levels. When international redispatch is possible, this relationship is highly non-
monotonic. Yet when international redispatch is possible, a higher load relative 
to the available transmission capacity almost always leads to lower benefits, for 
the same reasons we provided in the previous subsection. However, the 
variation of possible benefits is greater when load alone is varied than when load 
and generation are varied in proportion; thus, the effects of higher load and 
higher capacity appear to partially cancel each other. 
 
 
Fig. 9 Benefits as a function of load 
 
4.7. Load asymmetry 
Fig. 9 displayed the unit commitment benefits of LMP when the net loads in 
nodes C and D are scaled up or down simultaneously. Fig. 10 shows these 
benefits when instead the load at node C is multiplied by x, while the load at node 
D is multiplied by (2-x), where x is the load asymmetry multiplier, thus 
increasing the asymmetry in loads between the two nodes. As asymmetry 
increases (i.e., as x diverges from 1.0), transmission flows might then tend to be 
concentrated on one line rather than spread evenly between the two 
international lines. Hence, we anticipated that increasing asymmetry would 
inflate the benefit of considering actual transmission constraints and flows in 
day-ahead decisions compared to a single NTC between the two countries.  
Surprisingly, however, an increase in benefits as x moved further from 1.0 was 
not observed. The unit commitment benefits of LMP peak at a load asymmetry 
multiplier of 0.85 for NTC-ID with optimal NTCs and NTC-NID, and at a multiplier 
of 1.05 for NTC-ID with an NTC of 1700 MW. On either side of these multipliers, 
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benefits decrease. This is not only true for optimal NTCs and NTCs set at 1700 
MW, but for most NTCs. 
 The reasons for these effects are complex, as several things change 
simultaneously when the load asymmetry multiplier is varied. First, although 
more asymmetric loads can lead to higher benefits of LMP, the load asymmetry 
does not increase by the same proportion in every real-time scenario, and there 
is always one scenario in which the load asymmetry actually decreases if load 
asymmetry multipliers move further away from 1. Secondly, the distribution of 
the total net load across the scenarios changes with the load asymmetry 
multiplier. In the base case, there is one scenario with a total net load of 4400 
MW (scenario HH), two with a net load of 3200 MW (scenarios HL and LH) and 
one with a net load of 2000 MW (scenario LL). When the load asymmetry 
multiplier is varied, the total net load at C and D in scenarios HH and LL does not 
change, and neither does the average load across all scenarios. However, the 
loads in scenarios HL and LH do change, for example, to 2600 MW and 3800 MW, 
respectively, for a multiplier of 0.5. These effects interact with the other model 
constraints to result in the benefit curves shown in Fig. 10, which show that the 
benefits of LMP do not necessarily increase if loads become more asymmetric, 
and that they may even decrease. 
 The figures also show that the benefits of international redispatch vary 
only slightly with the load asymmetry multiplier. For instance, when NTCs are 
not set optimally, the additional benefit of international redispatch is relatively 
constant around 12.7%. In contrast, the unit commitment benefits vary 
considerably (on a proportional basis) over the range of x, from zero to 0.8% and 
1.8% for the optimal NTC and 85% NTC (1700 MW) cases, respectively.  
  
 
Fig. 10 Benefits as a function of load asymmetry  
 
4.8. Load correlation 
Finally, we consider the correlation in net loads at nodes C and D by changing 
scenario probabilities by varying parameter a. As noted above, this parameter 
can be interpreted as a correlation, where a=0 represents perfect positive 
correlation (when load is high at one node, it is high at the other), a=0.25 a 
situation with zero correlation, and a=0.5 perfect negative correlation (high load 
at one node is balanced by low load at the other). Thus, r = 1-4a is the correlation 
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of loads in nodes C and D. Fig. 11 shows the results of a model runs with varying 
correlations. 
 From most values of r, the benefits increase in r for the NTC-ID model 
with optimal NTC and the NTC-NID model, although, as elsewhere, this 
relationship is non-monotonic. In the NTC-NID model, this relationship is less 
pronounced but still noticeable. These results are surprising. When the 
correlation is high between the net loads in nodes C and D, it is likely that the 
flows on the two international transmission lines will not be far apart. When this 
correlation decreases, there is more asymmetry in loads, and consequently the 
flows on the two transmission lines are more likely to diverge. In that situation, 
representing the four transmission constraints in the system with a single NTC is 
more difficult, which could lead to larger LMP benefits.  
 However, as in the earlier analysis where the load asymmetry was varied, 
this is not the only way in which the correlation can affect the benefits. Firstly, 
there is also a total load effect, as the variance of the total load (C+D) across 
scenarios increases in r. Secondly, as explained above, the non-anticipativity 
constraint in eq. (9) can cause the net load in the extreme scenario HH to 
constrain the commitment of generators in node A and B. The probability of this 
scenario is, of course, also a function of r. 
 This illustrates that it is not always straightforward to anticipate the 
effects of a parameter on the benefits of LMP. Several effects can interact to 
produce counterintuitive results.  
 
 
Fig. 11 Benefits as a function of load correlation 
 
4.9. Uncertainty in net load of Country 1 
In the above, we assumed the load in importing Country 2 was uncertain. As a 
sensitivity analysis, we made several model runs where there is also uncertainty 
in exporting Country 1, which could occur, e.g., if significant wind generation 
exists there. Table 3 shows the net loads used in this analysis. Negative net loads 
occur when the available wind capacity exceeds demand.  
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Table 3 Peak load net of wind in all scenarios (MW) 
h HH HL LH HH 
A 0 0 -800 -800 
B 0 -800 0 -800 
C 2200 2200 1800 1800 
D 2200 1800 2200 1800 
 
Unit commitment and redispatch benefits were calculated for several generator 
and load parameter sets under these assumptions. The general magnitude of 
benefits did not appreciably differ from those obtained with Country 2 
uncertainty only, so we do not discuss them further. 
 
 5. Conclusions 
First, coupling international day-ahead and real-time power markets using nodal 
pricing can lead to significant benefits compared to NTC-based market coupling 
only day-ahead. This has already been shown in many other studies. However, 
these studies do not consider the combined effect of unit commitment 
constraints and uncertain load and wind forecasts. Our simulations indicate that 
LMP can significantly improve unit commitment decisions, saving between 0% to 
1% of the fuel costs of non-baseload plants, depending on the assumed 
parameters. This can be compared to the 0.1% of European fuel costs reported in 
Barth et al. (2009), the only study that is directly comparable to ours. However, 
unlike our analysis, that study did not consider within-country transmission, 
commitment of individual units, or a range of NTC values. 
 Secondly, full LMP-based market coupling both day-ahead and in real-
time will, at least in theory, lead to the lowest costs. However, international 
coordination of balancing while respecting transmission constraints can provide 
significant benefits even if unit commitment decisions consider only NTC 
constraints rather than the full network. Such coordination would allow 
adaptation of power schedules between markets to depend on real-time load and 
wind scenarios and would encourage trade. This supports the conclusions of 
Vandezande et al. (2009). In our system, the benefits of international redispatch 
are at least an order of magnitude greater than the unit commitment benefits of 
LMP under most assumptions. 
 Finally, although both benefits can be significant, their magnitudes greatly 
depend on the exact load, generation, and transmission characteristics of the 
electricity markets. Generator sizes, demand levels at the various nodes, installed 
transmission capacity, load asymmetry and load correlation can all influence 
these benefits, and a small change in one of these parameters can result in 
significant increases or decreases, especially for unit commitment benefits. 
These effects are often non-monotonic, and are unlikely to be generalisable; thus, 
the benefits for specific systems need to be estimated by using parameters 
appropriate for those systems, considering the variation of loads and other 
parameters over the year. For our test systems, at their largest, benefits can 
amount to more than 25% of optimal production costs for non-baseload plants 
when international redispatch is not possible, and more than 2% when it is, 
although they are more typically around 8% and 0.8%, respectively.  
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 Although our numerical results cannot therefore be viewed as definitive 
statements of the effect of various parameters, some trends are evident. When 
international redispatch is possible, smaller generators, higher minimum run 
levels and more symmetric, and positively correlated loads at different locations 
(net of wind) usually lead to higher benefits. When international redispatch is 
not possible, the effects of parameter choices often have a pronounced trend. In 
that case, smaller generators, higher minimum run levels, larger transmission 
capacities, and loads that are lower, more symmetric or positively correlated 
generally result in higher benefits. In both cases, continuous approximations of 
binary commitment variables can significantly overstate the unit commitment 
benefits of LMP-based market coupling for small systems.  
 The results are summarised in Table 4, which lists the range of benefits 
across the sampled range of parameters. This indicates how important these 
parameters are in determining the benefits of LMP and coordinated balancing. 
(For model NTC-NID, there is no separate column for the 85% NTC assumption, 
as its results are in most cases the same as the optimal NTC.)  
We note, however, that the estimated benefits of LMP and international 
redispatch may be overstated for two reasons. First, even if operators run day-
ahead markets considering only NTC values between markets, generation 
owners may alter their unit commitment if they recognize that cost savings are 
possible once real-time arrives. In particular, if those owners are forward-
looking, anticipating the effect of imposing network constraints upon the real-
time market, and there are no restrictions on international redispatch, they 
might self-commit units subject to the actual network constraints rather just the 
NTC. This could lower the benefits of LMP, especially in a simple network we 
considered. However, as networks get larger or more complex, this will be more 
difficult, as more information is needed in order to self-commit optimally 
Secondly, we have analysed a relatively small system and, to determine the unit 
commitment and international redispatch benefits of LMP without distortion 
from other market failures, we have not included some market features currently 
observed in European markets. In particular, we have not included any so-called 
“N-1” security constraints due to possible equipment outages. Their inclusion 
could change the results. Larger systems should be analysed in future research 
using stochastic unit commitment formulations that include such security 
constraints. 
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Table 4 Results overview (benefit ranges across simulations as % of system costs under LMP) 
 Benefits of LMP (No 
international 
redispatch)a  
Unit commitment benefits of LMPb  LMP benefits from 
international 
redispatch 
(Optimal NTC)c 
With international 
redispatch (Optimal 
NTC)  
With international 
redispatch @85% 
NTC 
Generator size 
and total 
capacity 
Higher for large 
generators 
(5.5-16.88%) 
No clear pattern 
(0-0.59%) 
No clear pattern, but 
highest for large 
generators (0-2.53%) 
No clear pattern 
(5.50-16.49%) 
Generator 
size, fixed 
total capacity 
Higher for smaller 
generators 
 
Higher for smaller 
generators 
Higher for smaller 
generators 
No clear pattern 
Minimum run 
levels 
Higher for higher 
minimum run 
levels 
(7.67-20.59%) 
Relatively constant, 
but lower for very 
high min run levels 
(0-0.60%) 
Generally higher for 
higher min run levels, 
but lower for very 
high min run levels 
(0.12-1.81%) 
Higher for higher 
minimum run 
levels 
(6.67-20.56%) 
Transmission Higher for larger 
transmission 
capacity 
(9.20-18.71%) 
No clear pattern 
(0-0.51%) 
No clear pattern 
(0-2.07%) 
Higher for larger 
transmission 
capacity 
(7.14-18.71%) 
Load levels Higher for lower 
loads (8.00-27.03) 
No clear pattern 
(0-0.84%) 
No clear pattern 
(0-2.22%) 
Higher for lower 
loads (6.69-
27.03%) 
Load 
asymmetry 
Higher for more 
symmetric loads 
(12.80-14.98%) 
Constant for many 
asymmetry levels, 
but generally higher 
for more symmetric 
loads 
(0-0.76%) 
Higher for more 
symmetric loads 
(0-1.86%) 
Relatively constant 
(12.01-14.98) 
Load 
correlation  
Higher for more 
positively 
correlated loads 
(0.43-15.07%) 
Higher for more 
positively 
correlated loads 
(0-1.13%) 
Generally higher for 
more positively 
correlated loads, but 
no clear pattern for 
high negative 
correlations 
(0.20-1..35%) 
Higher for more 
positively 
correlated loads 
(0.34-14.06%) 
a. Difference in total system costs (19) between models NTC-NID (Optimal NTC) and LMP, divided by (19) 
for model LMP. (Results for NTC-NID at 85% of thermal capacity not appreciably different.) 
b. Difference in (19) between models NTC-ID and LMP, divided by (19) for model LMP. 
c. Difference in (19) between models NTC-NID (Optimal NTC) and LMP, divided by (19) for model LMP. 
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 Appendix – Results for all NTCs 
 
 
Figure A1 – Benefits as a function of generator size (NTC-ID) 
 
 
Figure A2 – Benefits as a function of generator size (NTC-NID) 
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Figure A3 – Benefits as a function of minimum run levels (NTC-ID) 
 
 
Figure A4 – Benefits as a function of minimum run levels (NTC-NID) 
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Figure A5 – Benefits as a function of generator size and load / transmission capacity (NTC-ID) 
 
 
Figure A6 – Benefits as a function of generator size and load / transmission capacity (NTC-NID) 
 
 
 
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Size/load multiplier
B
e
n
e
fi
t
NTC [MW]
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Size/load multiplier
B
e
n
e
fi
t
NTC [MW]
 30 
 
Figure A7 – Benefits as a function of load levels (NTC-ID) 
 
 
Figure A8 – Benefits as a function of load levels (NTC-NID) 
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Figure A9 – Benefits as a function of load asymmetry (NTC-ID) 
 
 
Figure A10 – Benefits as a function of load asymmetry (NTC-NID) 
 
 
 
0.50
0.70
0.90
1.10
1.30
1.50
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Load asymmetry multiplier
B
e
n
e
fi
t
NTC [MW]
0.50
0.70
0.90
1.10
1.30
1.50
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Load asymmetry multiplier
B
e
n
e
fi
t
NTC [MW]
 32 
 
Figure A11 – Benefits as a function of load correlation (NTC-ID) 
 
Figure A12 – Benefits as a function of load correlation (NTC-NID) 
Note: rotated from A11 
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